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Abstract; The objectives of this research are to examine (1) the 
effect of the good corporate governance mechanism (audit 
committee, size of the commissioner’s board, and proportion of 
independent commissioner’s board) on firm value. (2) The effect 
of the leverage on  firm value, (3) The effect of the firm size on 
firm  value, and (4) The effect of good corporate governance 
mechanism (audit committee, size of the commissioner’s board, 
and proportion of independent commissioner’s board), leverage, 
and firm size on firm value. The population in this research is the 
entire manufacture firm which listed in IDX 2007-2011. 
Sampling technique used in this research is judgment sampling, 
with the sum of the sample 28 firm for 5 years (2007-2011). 
Double linier regression is used as data analysis technique, both t 
test and F test. The results of this research are (1) Good 
corporate governance’s mechanism, which including the size of 
commissioner’s board affect on the firm value, meanwhile audit 
committee and the proportion of independent commissioner’s 
board doesn’t affect on the firm value; (2) Leverage doesn’t 
affect on the firm value; (3) The firm size affects on the firm 
value; and (4) good corporate governance mechanisms (audit 
committee, size of the commissioner’s board, and proportion of 
independent commissioner’s board), leverage, and firm size 
affect on the firm value. 
 
Key words: Firm size, Firm value, Good corporate governance 
mechanism, Leverage  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The increase of the company's high value is a long-term goal 
that should be achieved and will be reflected in its stock 
market price. This is because investor assessment for the firm 
can be observed through the company's stock price traded on 
the stock exchange for companies that have gone public. The 
higher shareholder value indicates the greater public 
confidence in the company. Salvatore (2005) states that the 
primary goal of companies that have going public is to 
increase the prosperity of the owner or shareholders by 
increasing the value of the firm.  
There are many factors that can determine the firm 
value, one of which is Good Corporate Governance (GCG).   
 





A good set of GCG practices and policies is positively related 
to firm value. The conceptual framework of corporate 
governance studies was developed over the premise that there 
are potential problems derived from the separation between 
ownership and control. In the process maximizing the 
company value, there would be conflict of interest between 
managers and shareholders (the company owner) that is often 
called the agency problem. It is not rare that the management 
company managers have different goals and interests that 
conflict with company main objective and often ignore the 
shareholder interests. A different interest between managers 
and shareholders has resulted in conflicts commonly called 
agency conflict. This happens because managers prioritize 
personal interests; otherwise shareholders do not like the 
personal interests of managers because of what the manager 
will add to costs for the company resulting decrease in 
corporate profits and the effect on stock prices thus lowering 
the firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
Based on above explanation, there is a need for GCG 
arising in connection with the principal-agency theory. 
Implementation of GCG expected to be useful to increase and 
maximize the firm value. GCG is expected to seek a balance 
between the various interests that can provide benefits to the 
company comprehensively. GCG implementation can be 
reflected in firm value as seen from the company's stock price. 
Results of the previous studies show that the effect of 
corporate governance on firm value has not been consistent. 
Eberhart (2012), Machfoedz (2006) which found that GCG 
has positive effect on firm value. However research conducted 
by Debby et al. (2013) found two important findings. Firstly 
managerial ownership has negatively effects firm value, 
secondly audit committee has negatively effects firm value.  
Value of the firm can also be influenced by the size 
of the leverage generated by the company.  In corporate 
finance theory, the debt finance and equity finance are main 
sources of external finance. However the matter is how them 
to be composes of to minimize the agency costs and maximize 
the firm value. Leverage reflects the extent to which debt and 
preferred stock are used in addition to common stock. 
Leverage is used to amplify firm profit rate over the business 
cycle (Hirschey, 2010).  
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 The seminal work by Modigliani and Miller argues 
that financial leverage is irrelevant to firm value. Further 
studies by researchers have reached a paradoxical stage where 
an empirical issue has been raised that whether debt financing 
enhances or destroys firm value. The debt financing can create 
value because of the tax advantage and it can also destroy 
value because of the accompanying bankruptcy costs. As the 
financial leverage increases, the risk to stockholders increases 
because the higher leverage will cause greater volatility in 
earnings and greater volatility in the stock price. Researchers 
have a different view point on the impact of leverage  
structure on the value of the firm. The researchers have found 
that impact on the value of the firm has proven inconclusive. 
Research conducted by Cheng and Tzeng (2009), Sharma 
(2006), Choudhary (2010) showed a positive effect of 
leverage on firm value. While the studies done by Biabani 
Kaviani (2012), Mahendra (2011) and Adelegan (2007) found 
a negative effect of leverage on firm value.  
The concept of leverage is very important to 
demonstrate the financial analysis in view of the tradeoff 
between risks and benefit ratio of the best decisions using 
various angles. This is become financial manager task to make 
the plan, analysis and control activities. Companies that have a 
high level of financial leverage can result in a financial 
hardship (financial distress) to be able to settle its debt 
obligations. In other words, financial leverage has particularly 
good effects and bad for the company, may cause the 
company to develop better performance, but also can result 
bad performance, or can even result in bankruptcy or 
insolvent condition. 
Beside GCG and leverage, another variable which is 
also identified to have an impact on firm value is firm size. 
Firm size is scale in which the size of the company can be 
classified according to various ways, including: total assets, 
log size, stock market value, etc. Firm size is considered that 
able to influence firm value since the larger size or scale of the 
company, the easier the firm to get funding sources in both 
internal and external. Variable firm size is chosen because 
there are differences in the results of previous studies. From 
the results of research Taswan and Soliha (2002) and Yunita 
(2010) show that firm size has a positive effect on firm value. 
While research Indrajaya and Setiadi (2011) found different 
results, firm size has no effect on firm value.  
Related with the description above, as supported by 
the results of previous studies which contradiction, then the 
research problems can be formulated as follows: (1) how the 
mechanisms of corporate governance (audit committee, board 
size, and the proportion of independent board) affect the value 
of firm?; (2) Is the leverage effect on firm value?; and (3) 
whether the firm size effect on the value of firm? Meanwhile, 
the goal of this study are: (1) to determine the effect of good 
corporate governance mechanisms (audit committee, board 
size, and the proportion of independent board) on firm value, 
(2) to determine the effect of leverage on firm value, (3 ) to 
determine the effect of firm size on firm value, and (4) to 
determine the mechanisms of good corporate governance 
(audit committee, board size, and the proportion of 
independent board), leverage, and firm size on firm value.  
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
Value of the Company (Firm Value) 
According Febrina (2010) the firm value is selling 
firm or growing value for shareholders, the firm value will be 
reflected in the market price of its shares. According Febrina 
(2010) firm value is selling firm or growing value for 
shareholders, the firm value will be reflected in the market 
price of its shares. Firm value according to Rika and Islahudin 
(2008:7) is defined as the market value. Value of the company 
can provide maximum shareholder wealth if the stock price 
increased. The higher the stock price will result on the higher 
the shareholder wealth. To reach the general firm value 
investors handed over its management to the professionals. A 
professional is positioned as a manager or commissioner. 
Firm value can be indicated or implied from a 
number of variables or signals inherent in the company if the 
owner cannot afford imply its value, then they will only 
receive compensation for the value of the average firm. As a 
result, the firm which has good quality, the value to be 
received will be below the true value, whereas a poor quality 
firm will receive a score above the true value (Gumanti: 
1998). In this study, the firm value is proxy by Price to Book 
Value (PBV). Price to Book Value is the ratio between the 
market price and the book value of shares (Arifin, 2005). In 
other words, increasing Price to Book Value would raise the 
stock price. 
 
Good Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Corporate governance is the exercise of authority over the 
members of a corporate community based on formal 
structures, rules and processes. This authority is exercised in 
accordance with a body of rules that define the rights and 
powers of shareholders, boards of directors and managers 
(Steiner and Steiner, 2010). Corporate governance is control 
systems that help corporations effectively administer 
economic resources (Hirschey, 2010). Corporate Governance 
is a mechanism used to reduce agency problems between 
managers and stockholders, including inside decisions and 
control systems and outside market effects (Yang and Shan, 
2008). In this paper three variables of GCG mechanisms will 
be analyzed namely audit committee, size of the 
commissioner’s board and proportion of independent 
commissioner’s board. 
The audit committee has important role and strategic 
in terms of maintaining the credibility of financial statements 
preparation process as well as to create adequate supervisory 
system for company and the implementation of good 
corporate governance. The mission of audit committee, who 
are hire by the board, is to examine the firm’s accounting 
control system and give their opinion as to whether or not the 
firm’s financial statements offer a fair representation of the of 
the firm’s financial position.  If the audit committee work 
effectively, the control of the company would be better so that 
the commissioners board composition play a role in oversight.  
Board of directors evolved to perform the critical role 
of monitoring hired manager. Shareholders elect people on the 
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 board of directors to represent stockholders interests. The 
board is charged with four broad functions (Hirschey, 2010) : 
(1) hire, evaluate, and perhaps even replace management, (2) 
approve major operating proposals (large capital expenditures, 
acquisitions etc), (3) approve major financial problems 
(issuance of stocks and bonds, dividend payments, stock 
repurchases etc), and (4) offer expert operating and strategic 
advice to management.  The higher the proportion of 
independent commissioners in the company, the board is 
expected to perform supervisory tasks and provide advice to 
the of directors effectively, for example independent 
commissioners may actively encourage management to adopt 
policies that will increase tock market values. The 
composition of the board may affect the management in 
preparing the financial statements in order to obtain a 
qualified profit (Rachmawati and Triatmoko, 2007).  
Independent auditor – also known as outside director 
- means a director who is not connected or associated with the 
company in any manner and works only to safeguard the 
interest of shareholders. The existence of independent 
directors is expected to increase the role of the board in order 
to create good corporate governance within the company.  
Outside directors act as experts in decision control and signal 
their expertise to the labor market by acting in shareholders’ 
interests (Coulton and Taylor, 2004). Many evidences show 
that the existence outside auditors can enhance GCG. Share 
prices of take over bidders whose boards are controlled by 
outside directors rise significantly more when their bids are 
announced than do the shares of other bidders controlled by 
insiders (Byrd and Hickman, 1992). Firms with outsider – 
controlled boards are less likely to engage in questionable 
accounting practices (Bushman et al.,2002)  
 
Firm size 
Basically, the size of the company can be expressed 
on total assets, log size, sales and market capitalization. Large 
firms have a lower risk than small firm. This is because large 
companies have better control of the market conditions, so 
that they are able to face economic competition. In addition, 
large firms have more resources to enhance the firm value 
because it has better access to sources of external information 
than small firm (Yunita, 2010). Meanwhile, firm size also 
determines the level of investor confidence. The bigger the 
firm will result on more well known by the public, which 
means getting easier to obtain information that will enhance 
shareholder value. Even large companies that have total assets 
with substantial value of the assets attract investors to invest 
in the company. In terms of firm size seen from the total assets 
owned by the company, it can be used for the company's 
operations. 
Companies that have total assets of the firm shows 







has a positive cash flow and is considered to have good 
prospects in a relatively long period of time, but it also reflects 
that the firm is relatively more stable and better able to make a 
profit compared with the total assets of which firm small. 
In connection with the above exposure, the greater 
the firm size, usually the information available to the investor 
in making an investment decision with respect to the shares of 
the company more and more (Siregar and Utama, 2005). Firm 




 Leverage is an important tool in measuring the 
effectiveness of corporate debt. By using leverage, companies 
will earn profits but on the other hand companies will face 
losses also (Weston and Copeland, 1997).   
 The leverage concept is an important consideration for 
investors in making stock assessment. Investors generally tend 
to avoid risk. Risk arising in the use of financial leverage is 
financial risk that called the additional risk imposed on 
shareholders as a result of the use of debt by the company. 
The higher the leverage will result on the greater the financial 
risk (Horne and Marchowicz, 2005). Expenditure decisions, 
could affect the ability of companies to generate profits for 
shareholders. On economic conditions, companies using 
greater debt portion greater than capital itself have greater 
capability to generate profit for shareholder than the company 
that use less than its own capital. In contrast, in poor 
economic conditions, companies that use the portion of the 
debt greater than capital itself will generate a return for 
shareholders smaller than the share of firms use less debt than 
its own capital. Debt ratio is a ratio that measures the 
proportion of funds coming from corporate debt to finance 
assets (Sudana, 2009:23). The greater the ratio, the greater the 
debt portion of the use of debt to finance investments in 
property, which means that the risk of increased corporate 
finance and the other way around. The creditors generally 
prefer that the company's debt ratio is lower because the lower 
the debt ratio, the higher the level of funding provided by the 
company's shareholders and the greater protection to creditors 
over unpaid debt risk. Companies with high leverage strategy 
is likely to face a more aggressive strategy of competitors who 
have lower levels of leverage and may lose market share in the 
product market oligopoly 
Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis Formulation 
 Based on the explanation above the conceptual framework 
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Conceptual Framework of the Present Study 
 
Based on the conceptual framework in Figure 1 above, the 
research hypotheses are formulated as follows: 
H1: Good Corporate governance mechanisms affect firm value 
H2: Leverage affects firm value 
H3: Firm Size affects firm value 
H4: GCG mechanisms, leverage and firm size affect firm value 
 
III RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Population and Sampling Techniques 
The population used in this research were all 
manufacturing companies listed on the stock exchanges of 
Indonesia from 2007-2011. Sampling technique used in this 
study is judgment sampling. The sample selection is related to 
the variables used data from this study. The sample used in 
this study consisted of 28 companies for 5 years (2007-2011). 
 
Research Variables 
Variables in this study can be classified into two, that 
is (1) the independent variable in this case GCG (audit 
committee, board size, and board of commissioners), leverage, 




Data analysis used in this study is multiple regression 
analysis. Before the regression test, there are several 
assumptions that must be fulfilled so that the resulting 
regression equation becomes valid. Classical assumption test 
consists of a test for normality, multicollinearity test, 
heteroskedasticity, and autocorrelation. This study used five 
independent variables and the dependent variable, the 
regression models are as follows: 
FV = β0 + β1AC + β2 BCSIZE + β3PIB+ β4 LEV+ β5 FSIZE+ ε 
Description: 
β0     = Intercept 
β1 - β5   = Regression coefficient 
AC         = Audit Committee 
BCSIZE   = size of board commissioners 
PIB     = proportion of independent board 
LEV   = Leverage 
FSIZE   = Firm size 
FV    = Firm value 
ε            = error 
 
IV RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
Based on SPSS output, multiple linear regression equation can 
be arranged as follows: 
 
Table 1 















AC - 0.022 -0.860 0.775 Rejected 
BCSIZE 0.061 1.690 0.010 Accepted 
PIB - 0.830 -8.350 0.116 Rejected 
LEV -0.141 -1.410 0,164 Rejected 
FSIZE  0.661 6.760 0.011 Accepted 
Constanta                      = -1.735  
F count                         = 49.668  
Probability (Sig)     = 0,000 
Adjusted R square           = 0.299  
Source: Primary data (processed), 2013 
 
From Table 1 above, it can be seen that the adjusted 
R square value of 0.299 and the calculated F value is equal to 
49.668 with a probability rate of 0.000 (p <0.05). These 
represent hypothesis stated there is significant influence 
acceptable. GCG variable (audit committee/AC, board size / 
BCSIZE, the proportion of independent board/PIB), leverage / 
LEV, and firm size/FSIZE are simultaneously towards firm 
values /FV acceptable. 
Meanwhile, for the partial tests are detailed in Table 
1 will be described as follows: 
 
 
Good corporate governance 
Mechanism(GCG) 
  audit committee (X1) 
  size of the commissioner’s 
board (X2) 
  proportion of independent 
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 1. The first hypothesis (H1), i.e.:GCG mechanism (audit 
committee, board size, and the proportion of independent 
board) effect on firm value. Based on the results of the 
regression analysis are discussed hypothesis on each of the 
following variables: 
   a) H1a: the influence of the audit committee (AC) on firm 
value (FV)), it turns out the findings show that AC have 
no effect on firm value (FV) at the 0.05 level (P> 0.05), 
so that H0 is accepted and H1 rejected. This can be 
proved by the magnitude of the regression (b1) of -0.022; 
t count of -0.860; and a probability of 0.775 (p> 0.05). 
     b)  H1b: Influence of board size (BCSIZE) on firm value 
(FV), it turns out the findings indicate that BCSIZE has 
significant influence on firm value (FV) at the 0.05 level 
(P <0.05), so H0 is rejected and H1 is accepted. This can 
be proved by the magnitude of regression (b2) of 0.061 
and t count of 1,690 and a probability of 0.010 (p <0,05). 
    c) H1c: Influence of the independent board proportion (PIB) 
on firm value (FV), it turns out the findings indicate that 
PIB no effect on firm value (FV) at the 0.05 level (P> 
0.05), so that H0 is accepted and H1 rejected. This can be 
proved by the magnitude of regression (b3) is -0.830 and 
-8.350 and t calculates equal probability of 0.116 (p> 
0,05). 
2. The second hypothesis (H2), i.e.: leverage (LEV) effect on 
firm value (FV), the analysis showed that the LEV has no 
effect on firm value (FV) at the 0.05 level (P> 0.05), so 
that H0 is accepted and H1 rejected. This can be proved by 
the magnitude of regression (b4) -0.141dan t count -1410, 
and a probability of 0.164 (p> 0.05). 
3. The third hypothesis (H3), i.e.: firm size (FSIZE) on firm 
value (FV). The analysis showed that FSIZE has 
significant influence on firm value (FV) at the 0.05 level 
(P <0.05), so H0 is rejected and H1 is accepted. This can be 
proved by the magnitude of regression (b5) i.e. 0.661 and 
amounted to 6.760 t and a probability of 0.011 (p <0.05).  
 
Based on the results of multiple regression analysis 
shown in Table 1, it can produce regression equation as 
follows: 
 
FV= BCSIZE – 1.735–0.022AC + 0.061BCSIZE – 0.830PIB 
– 0.141LEV + 0.661FSIZE + ε  
V DISCUSSSION, LIMITATION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 Based on the results of multiple regression analysis, The F 
test shows that there is a significant relationship between 
corporate governance variables (audit committee/AC, board 
size/DKSIZE, the proportion of independent board / PIB), 
leverage/LEV, and firm size/FSIZE simultaneously to firm 
values/FV. It is also with the results of a partial analysis, 
particularly on the hypothesis (H1b) and Hypothesis three (H3) 
suggests that board size (BCSIZE) and firm size (FSIZE) 
effect on firm value (FV). 
 Meanwhile, the results of partial analysis by using t-test 
showed that the hypothesis 1 (H1b) is accepted which means 
that the board size (BCSIZE) have an influence on firm value 
(FV). This indicates that the size of the company's board size 
will determine the effectiveness of board functions and related 
monitoring functions, so that if the monitoring function is 
performed by the board of commissioners running as expected 
the targets to be achieved by the company to maximize firm 
value will be achieved. This finding supports the findings 
Siallagan and Machfoedz (2006) that stated GCG had positive 
effect on firm value. 
The next hypothesis three (H3) is also accepted, i.e.: 
firm size (FSIZE) effect on firm value (FV). These findings 
indicate that the firm size (FSIZE) would be great to have  
high commitment to continuously improve its performance, so 
the market will want to pay more expensive to acquire its 
shares because it believes will get favorable returns from the 
company. This finding supports Soliha and Taswan (2002) 
and Yunita (2010) stated that firm size has a positive effect on 
firm value. While research Indrajaya and Setiadi (2011) found 
different results, which do not influence firm size effect on 
firm value. 
In contrast to the analysis of the first hypothesis (H1a 
and H1c), the second hypothesis (H2) indicates that the 
findings do not support the firm value. Hypothesis 1 (H1a), 
which states the audit committee (AC) has an effect on firm 
value (FV), was rejected because it was not supported 
empirically. This means that the audit committee of the 
company will result in the lower value of the company and 
vice versa. These results are consistent with research 
Rachrnawati and Triatmoko (2007), but different with 
Siallagan and Machfoedz (2006). It can be explained that 
there is a possibility of the existence of an audit committee is 
not a guarantee that the company's performance will be better, 
so that the market assumes the existence of an audit committee 
is not a factor that they consider to appreciate firm value. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1c), which states the proportion of 
independent board (PIB) have an influence on firm value 
(FV), was rejected because it was not supported empirically. 
This means that the higher the proportion of independent 
board within the company, then the company will be the lower 
value, and vice versa. These results are consistent with 
research Rachmawati and Triatmoko (2007). It can be 
explained that a small proportion of the independent directors 
in the board of the company is not a guarantee that the 
company is not in financial reporting fraud company. 
Monitoring functions are performed independent board cannot 
reduce the behavior of managers to maximize their own 
interests. This causes the goal to maximize firm value will be 
hampered because of the difference in interest. 
 Hypothesis 2 (H2) which states have the effect of leverage 
on firm value (FV) was rejected because it was not supported 
empirically. This means that companies tend to use their assets 
to fund their own capital (internal financing) derived from 
retained earnings and share capital rather than using debt. The 
adequacy of the company's funds to finance its assets derived 
from capital itself makes companies reduce the proportion of 
debt. The excessive use of debt will reduce the benefits 
received for the use of debt because of the benefits received 
are not comparable to the costs incurred, so that a low 
proportion of debt that could increase the value of the 
company, otherwise the increase in debt can lower the value 
of the company. The result is contrary to previous research 
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 conducted by Adelegan (2007) which states that the leverage 
has a negative effect on firm value. 
Several limitations of this study may be noted. First, this 
study focus only on three factors that influence Firm value. 
Other factors that influence firm value  may exist that were 
not examined in this study. Previous studies suggest the others 
variable that might influence firm value, such as integration 
and diversification, human capital. Second, this study only use 
three GCG mechanisms, there are others GCG mechanisms 
that may affect the value of the firm, such as ownership 
structure, transparency. 
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